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REBUTTAL ARGUMENT
The State has Failed to Show that Agent Sotka's Terry frisk of Crooks was legally justified upon
a particularized suspicion that Crooks was oresentlv arrned or dangerous and not uDon unparticularized statements that weapons are occasionally found during dmg investigations.
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argues that "Agent Sotka's conduct in frisking Crooks
for weapons was a constitutionally reasonable measure taken for officer safety." (Brief of
Respondent, p. 6.) The State concedes that there existed no particularized suspicion that Crooks
was presently armed or dangerous. (Brief of Respondent, p. 7: "As an initial matter, there was
no testimony that Agent Sotka observed any suspicious bulges on Crooks, that Crooks had a
known reputation for violence, or that he had acted in a threatening manner.") Therefore, to
support its argument that the frisk was lawful, the State cites a number of cases and argues that
those cases support a rule whereby a Terry frisk may be upheld where there exists no suspicion
that a person is armed or dangerous, so long as police are confronting drug enterprises. (Brief of
Respondent, p. 7.) The State's arguments are unpersuasive because the cases the State cites in its
brief are factually dissimilar from Crooks' case.
For instance, in State v. Dreier, 139 Idaho 246, 76 P.3d 990 (Ct. App. 2003), which the
State relies upon, the Court of Appeals upheld a pat down search of the defendant after officers
learned of his presence at a home of a man who had consented to searches of his home as a
condition of his pre-trial release on a pending charge of attempted manufacturing of
methamphetamine. When the officers arrived at the home, they encountered a woman who told
the officers that none of the residents of the home were present, but that the Defendant was

asleep inside. Dreier, 139 Idaho at 248,249, 76 P.3d 992-993. When the defendant emerged
from the home, he admitted to one of the officer that he was a visitor at the home; was aware that
the home was subject to a search provision; and that there were drugs located in his "stuff'. 139
Idaho at 249,76 P.3d at 993. When asked by the officer whether he had any weapons, the
defendant motioned to his side where he was wearing a leather case attached to his belt which
contained a Leatherman's tool. Id. The officer took the Leatherman tool from the defendant's
belt and then asked the defendant if he had any other weapons. Id. The defendant responded that
he did not think he did. Id. The officer then patted the defendant down and during the pat-down
search a bag of marijuana fell out of the defendant's pants pocket. Id.
In upholding the district court's denial of the marijuana, as well as methamphetamine
later found in the defendant's belongings, the Court in Dreier agreed with the district court's
conclusion that there were specific and articulable facts known to the officer that justified the
pat-down search. Dreier, 139 Idaho at 250, 76 P.3d at 994. In Dreier, the Court stated:

The officer's encounter with Dreier occurred at a home subject to search for suspected
drug manufacturing activity. The danger posed to the safety of an officer conducting a
search of premises suspected of housing an illegal drug operation is increased by the
presence of a person found on the premises, who may be involved in the criminal
activities therein. See State v. Pierce, 137 Idaho 296,299-300,47 P.3d 1266, 1269-70
(Ct.App.2002) (The threat of violence to officers conducting a search of home suspected
of housing an illegal drug operation is greater because of the recognized propensity of
persons engaged in selling narcotics to carry firearms.). See also United States v.
Patterson, 885 F.2d 483,485 (8th Cir.1989) ("The possible danger presented by an
individual approaching and entering a structure housing a drug operation is obvious. In
fact, it would have been foolhardy for an objectively reasonable officer not to conduct a
security frisk under the circumstances.").
Additionally, the officer who conducted the pat-down search of Dreier had been present

when a search warrant was previously executed at the same home. During the previous
search, officers recovered approximately sixteen weapons from the home and some of the
weapons were loaded. The officer was also aware that Dreier was a frequent visitor to the
home and that Dreier was known to carry a firearm. Thus, there were specific and
articulable facts known to the officer which would lead a reasonable prudent person to
believe that Dreier could be armed and dangerous.
Furthermore, nothing in the initial stages of the encounter served to dispel the officer's
reasonable belief. When the officer asked Dreier whether he had any weapons, Dreier
made a motion to his side indicating that he did have a weapon. The officer recovered a
Leatherman, which the officer described as a tool similar to a knife or other object
capable of cutting. In view of the specific and articulable facts known to the officer at the
scene and based on the reasonable inferences drawn from a totality of the specific
circumstances presented, this Court concludes that the pat-down search of Dreier was
lawful.
139 Idaho at 250,251,76 P.3d at 994-995.

Dreier is factually dissimilar from the present case on many bases. First, Dreier involved
a situation where officers were responding to a home of a person suspected of manufacturing
methamphetamine or at least had been charged with the attempted manufacturing of
methamphetamine. Second, before any frisk of the defendant in Dreier occurred, an officer had
asked him several questions including: (1) whether there were any drugs inside the home, and (2)
whether he possessed any weapons. Third, the officer posed his questions to the defendant prior
to any pat-down frisk being conducted and only after the defendant had acknowledged that he
possessed drugs in his stuff and showed the officer that he had a Leatherman tool on his person.
In addition, in Dreier the officer conducting the pat-down search previously had been
present at the home when a search warrant had been executed and sixteen weapons, some loaded,
had been recovered. Lastly, the officer was also aware that the defendant was a frequent visitor
to the home and was known to carry a firearm.

Unlike Dreier - and the facts in State v. Pierce, 137 Idaho 296,47 P.3d 1266 (Ct. App.
2002) cited therein - the officers in Crooks' case were not investigating suspected drug
manufacturing activity. Instead, they were investigating a "controlled buy" of approximately
forty dollars ($40.00) worth of methamphetamine that had occurred at the home Kristopher Eby.
(Tr., p. 17, Ls. 2- 16; p. 18, Ls. 1- 10.) Moreover, even though there had been a "controlled buy"
at the residence earlier, the officers, including Agent Sotka possessed no information that
weapons had been observed by Katie Kelly at Eby's home. (See, Transcript, generally.)
When the officers arrived at Eby's residence, they did not speak with Crooks to ascertain
his identity or connection to the premises, but instead placed him in handcuffs and laid him
prone on the living room floor. (Tr., p. 47, Ls. 2-24.) Agent Sotka did not question Crooks about
the presence of either drugs or weapons in the home, nor even ask him how long Crooks had
been at the residence. (Id.) Instead, Agent Sotka - in his own words - "I began to do a pat down
as I always do." (Tr., p. Ls. 15-16.)
In other reported Idaho cases, courts have found the pat-down frisk of defendants lawfbl
based upon facts providing obvious justification that the police action was appropriate. See, State
v. Kester, 137 Idaho 643, 51 P.3d 457 (Ct. App. 2002) (Holding that the frisk of the defendant

who arrived at a home where a search warrant was being executed was appropriate where (1) the
encounter took place late at night, (2) defendant's explanation of why he was present was
questionable, (3) defendant was wearing a fanny pack which could conceal a weapon, (4)
officers knew that allegations had been made that the resident of the home had been trading
drugs in exchange for weapons.); State v. Con, 136 Idaho 858,41 P.3d 744 (Ct App. 2002)

(Holding the fiisk of defendant was lawful where (I) defendant's rented motel room contained
methamphetamine in plain view, a large unsheathed knife and mail addressed to the defendant,
(2) other occupant of the motel room had resisted arrest and been charged with aggravated
assault on a police officer, and (3) the officer contacting defendant upon defendant's return to the
motel was alone.); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552,989 P.2d 784 (Ct. App. 1999) (Officer's frisk
of defendant reasonable where (1) officer entering defendant's residence observed a large fixedblade knife sitting on top of boxes located near the door, (2) defendant had knife and sheath on
his belt, a (3) defendant became uncooperative with the officer when officer sought to remove
the knife from defendant's person and secure it during the police investigation.)
In the present case, the justification offered for Agent Sotka's pat-down frisk of Crooks
was merely the unparticularized statements of Sergeant Hildebrandt and Agent Sotka that
weapons are occasionally found during drug investigations. No evidence was offered that
Agent's Sotka's frisk of Crooks was based upon a particularized suspicion that Crooks was either
armed or dangerous and for that reason the frisk was unlawful.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Defendant Dale Crooks respectfully requests that this
Appellate Court reverse the decision of the district court denying his motion to suppress.
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